Submitter : Mrs. AVANI SHETH **Date:** 02/20/2007

Organization : INTERGRATED MEDICATION SERVICES INC.

Category : Pharmacist

Issue Areas/Comments

GENERAL

GENERAL

SEE ATTACHED

CMS-2238-P-1449-Attach-1.TXT

AVANI T SHETH, RPh, CCP,
16 BROWN COURT
LIVINGSTON,NJ 07039

VIA ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION

Leslie Norwalk
Acting Administrator
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Department of Health and Human Services
Attention: CMS-2238-P
Mail Stop C4-26-05
7500 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21244-1850

CMS file code: CMS - 2238 - P

Federal Register
Publication Date: December 22, 2006

Dear Acting Administrator Norwalk:

As an owner of an independent pharmacy store in New Jersey serve a diverse Medicaid patient population for pharmacy care needs, I am very troubled by the CMS proposed regulation referenced above that seeks to define and establish an average manufacters' price (AMP) for generic prescriptions for the Medicaid program. This proposed rule has many problems that must be corrected in order to ensure that my independent pharmacy can afford to continue provide Medicaid generic pharmacy prescription services to my Medicaid prescription patients without incurring unsustainable financial losses.

Below are my specific comments on and recommended changes to the proposed rule:

Inclusion of all mail order pharmacy prices in retail pharmacy class of trade.
Public Access Defines Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade
CMS is correct to exclude hospital and nursing home sales from the retail pharmacy class of trade for two reasons. First, hospital and nursing home pharmacies are extended prices not available to retail pharmacy. Second, nursing homes and hospitals are not deemed to be "publicly accessible." Mail order facilities are operated almost exclusively by PBMs, and as such they meet both of these criteria. Mail order facilities are extended special prices and they are not publicly accessible in the way that brick and mortar pharmacies are publicly accessible. Sales to mail order facilities should not be included in calculating the AMP.
"Retail pharmacy class of trade" definition should only include independent pharmacies, independent pharmacy franchises, independent chains, traditional chains, mass merchants and supermarket pharmacies - a definition that currently encompasses some 55,000 retail pharmacy locations.

Inclusion in AMP of PBM rebates, discounts, and other price concessions for drugs provided to retail pharmacy class of trade.
Inclusion in Best Price of PBM rebates, discounts and other price concessions.
Treatment of Manufacturer coupons with regard to Best Price.
Inclusion of Direct-to-Patient Sales with regard to AMP.

AMP Must Differ From Best Price

If AMP is to represent the price of drugs bound for the retail pharmacy class of trade, it should include and exclude components according to their impact on the acquisition price actually paid by the retail pharmacy class of trade.

CMS rightly excludes manufacturer rebates paid to state Medicaid programs, to the Department of Defense under TRICARE and to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). CMS should also exclude rebates paid to PBMs from AMP calculation: These rebates are not available to the retail pharmacy class of trade, and indeed, none of these funds are ever received by retail pharmacy; and the Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade does not have access to Direct to Patient Sale prices, and therefore these transactions should also be excluded from AMP calculation.

The Medicaid drug rebate program was created for states to collect rebates from manufacturers in much the same way that PBMs receive manufacturer rebates off of the market price of those drugs. Should manufacturers include PBM rebates in AMP calculation, the AMP would be driven below available market price thus undermining the FUL and shrinking the rebates states receive.

For states to receive a rebate benefit more closely matching the marketplace, Best Price was created as a contrasting measure to AMP. Manufacturers must pay states either a percentage of AMP or the difference between AMP and Best Price, whichever is greater. In this context, Best Price is then the most appropriate vehicle in which to include PBM rebates, discounts and other price concessions as well as Direct-to-Patient sales and manufacturer coupons.

PBM price concessions reporting to CMS.

PBM Transparency Necessary to Assess Manufacturer Rebates

PBMs are not subject to regulatory oversight, either at the federal or state levels. Therefore to include the rebates, discounts, or other price concessions given the current state of non-regulation would be improper. Specifically, to include such provisions in the calculation of AMP without any ability to audit those "adjustments" to the net drug prices is inappropriate. CMS requested comments on the operational difficulties of tracking said rebates, discount or charge backs. The difficulty in doing so begins with the lack of regulatory oversight, laws and/or regulations that require the PBMs to either disclose that information or make it available upon request by a regulatory agency. Further, the difficulty continues because PBMs have been allowed, due to a lack of regulation, to keep that information hidden, i.e., there is no transparency in the PBM industry.

PBMs, have fought in both the national and state legislative arenas, to keep that information from review by the government and their own clients. Their contracts are not subject to audit provisions, except in some cases where the client selects an auditor that the PBM approves. Lastly, the PBM is allowed - again through lack of regulation - to self refer to its wholly owned mail order pharmacy. No other entity in the health care arena is allowed to self-refer to its own wholly owned business.

Allowing the use of 12-month rolling average estimates of all lagged discounts for AMP.

AMP Must Be Reported Weekly

There are frequent changes in drug prices that are NOT accurately captured by a monthly reporting period. Under the proposed rule, manufactures supply CMS the pricing data 30 days after the month closes, which means that the published pricing data will be at least 60 days behind the market place pricing. Invoice pricing to community pharmacy, however, continues to change daily. In order to accurately realize market costs and reimburse retail pharmacy accordingly, AMP data must be reported weekly rather than by using a 12 month rolling average.

Use of the 11-digit NDC to calculate AMP.

AMP Must Be Reported At The 11-Digit NDC to Ensure Accuracy

We concur with the many reasons CMS offers in support of an 11-digit NDC calculation of the FUL. CMS suggests calculating the FUL at the 11 digit NDC would offer advantages to the program, will align with State Medicaid drug payments based on package size, will allow greater transparency, and would not be significantly more difficult than calculating the FUL from the 9 digit code. Pharmacies already purchase the most economical package size as determined by individual pharmacy volume. Pharmacies should not be mandated by CMS to purchase in excess of need just to attain a limited price differential. Additionally, based on the GAO study on Medicaid Federal Upper Limits, a FUL based on the 9-dight NDC would NOT adequately cover pharmacy acquisition cost. The 11-digit NDC must be used when calculating the FUL.

Assessment of impact on small pharmacies, particularly in low income areas with high volume of Medicaid patients.

Impact on small pharmacies demonstrated by (General Accountability Office (GAO) findings

The GAO findings demonstrate the devastating impact the proposed rule will have on small independent pharmacies. No business can stay in operation while experiencing a 36% loss on each transaction. This deficit cannot be overcome by aggressive purchasing practices, rebates, generic rebates or even adequate dispensing fees.

The impact on independent pharmacies also cannot be mitigated by an increase in state-set dispensing fees. IF state Medicaid programs take the suggested initiatives of the CMS Medicaid Roadmap and increase these dispensing fees, states are still prohibited from exceeding the FUL in the aggregate on prescription reimbursements. It is also unlikely that states would set dispensing fees high enough to cover the average $10.50 per prescription cost of dispensing as determined by the most recently completed Cost of Dispensing Study.

Conducted by the accounting firm Grant Thornton, LLP, the Cost of Dispensing study used data from over 23,000 community pharmacies and 832 million prescriptions to determine national cost of dispensing figures as well as state level cost of dispensing information for 46 states. This landmark national study was prepared for the Coalition for Community Pharmacy Action (CCPA), with financial support from the Community Pharmacy Foundation.

If these dispensing costs, in addition to drug acquisition costs, are not covered, pharmacies simply cannot afford to continue participation in the Medicaid program. By law, CMS cannot mandate minimum dispensing fees for the Medicaid program; however, the proposed rule must provide a comprehensive definition on Cost to Dispense for states to consider when setting Dispensing Fees.

CMS Must Employ a Complete Definition on Cost to Dispense

The Definition of "Dispensing Fee" does not reflect the true costs to pharmacists/pharmacies to dispense Medicaid drugs. This definition must include valuable pharmacist time spent doing any and all of the activities needed to provide prescriptions and counseling such as communicating by telephone, fax and email with state Medicaid agencies and PBMs, entering in billing information; and other real costs such as rent, utilities and mortgage payments.

Community pharmacists regularly provide pick-up and delivery, house calls and third party administrative help to beneficiaries. Most importantly, they provide an important health, safety and counseling service by having knowledge of their patients' medical needs and can weigh them against their patients' personal preferences when working to ensure that a doctor's prescription leads to the best drug regimen for the patient.

Policing and Oversight Process for AMP and Best Price Must Be Included

The new proposed Dual Purpose of AMP requires that AMP be calculated and reported properly and accurately. Both the GAO and the HHS Office of Inspector General have issued reports citing historical variances in the reporting and calculation of AMP. While some of these concerns will be corrected in the new rule, CMS has not proposed nor defined a policing and oversight process for AMP and Best Price calculation, reporting and auditing.
All calculations should be independently verifiable with a substantial level of transparency to ensure accurate calculations. An AMP-based reimbursement that underpays community pharmacy will have dire consequences for patient care and access.

In summary, the proposed rule needs to be seriously revised and resubmitted for public comments in order to address the following issues:

? The formula for AMP-based Federal Upper Limits (FULs) in the proposed rule will not cover pharmacy acquisition costs for multiple-source generic medications

? Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) was never intended to serve as a basis for reimbursement.

? To be an appropriate benchmark, AMP must be defined to reflect the actual cost paid by retail pharmacy. This will be accomplished by

1. Excluding all rebates and price concessions made by manufacturers which are NOT available to retail pharmacy.
2. Excluding all mail order facilities and PBM pricing from AMP calculation. Mail order facilities and PBMs are extended special prices from manufacturers and they are not publicly accessible in the way that brick and mortar pharmacies are publicly accessible.

? Reporting AMP at the 11-digit NDC level to ensure accuracy.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit my comments on this proposed rule and I hope you will seriously revise this proposal in order to ensure the continued access of Medicaid prescription patients to their community-based pharmacies.

Respectfully,

Avani T. Sheth, R.Ph., CCP,
INTEGRATED MEDICATION SERVICES INC.,

Submitter : Mr. Robert Bjurstrom **Date:** 02/20/2007

Organization : Mr. Robert Bjurstrom

Category : Pharmacist

Issue Areas/Comments

GENERAL

GENERAL

The proposed AMP definition under CMS-2238-P Prescription Drugs will cause great harm to independent pharmacies. It is estimated that the reimbursement will be far below what it actually costs pharmacies to buy the drugs. I respectfully request that CMS redefine AMP so that it reflects what they actually pay for the product. If reimbursements do not cover costs, many independents may have to turn their Medicaid patients away.

A proper definition of AMP is the first step towards fixing this problem. I understand that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has been given wide leeway in writing that definition. I ask that AMP be defined so that it reflects pharmacies' total ingredient cost. If AMP were defined so that it covers 100% of pharmacists' ingredient costs, then an adequate reimbursement could be attained.

As it is currently defined, AMP is estimated to cover only HALF the market price paid by community pharmacy. Currently, each manufacturer defines AMP differently, and without a proper definition, Medicaid reimbursement will not cover pharmacy acquisition costs.

Pharmacies that are underpaid on Medicaid prescriptions will be forced to turn Medicaid patients away, cutting access for patients, especially in rural communities.

Additionally, the reimbursement cuts will come entirely from generic prescription drugs so unless AMP is defined to cover acquisition costs an incentive will be created to dispense more brands that could end up costing Medicaid much, much more.

Please issue a clear definition of Average Manufacturers Price that covers community pharmacy acquisition costs. The definition should be issued as soon as possible, before AMP takes effect

Submitter : Mr. JAMES MARMAR **Date:** 02/20/2007

Organization : VERMONT PHARMACISTS ASSOCIATION

Category : Health Care Professional or Association

Issue Areas/Comments

GENERAL

GENERAL

SEE ATTACHMENT

CMS-2238-P-1451-Attach-1.DOC

CMS-2238-P-1451-Attach-2.PDF

CMS-2238-P-1451-Attach-3.TXT

March 27, 2007

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Attention CMS 2238-P Mail Stop C4-26-05
7500 Security Blvd
Baltimore, Maryland 21244-1850

Subject: Medicaid Program: Prescription Drugs; AMP Regulation
CMS 2238-P RIN 0938-AO20

The VERMONT PHARMACISTS ASSOCIATION is pleased to submit these comments to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) regarding CMS' December 20, 2006 proposed regulation that would provide a regulatory definition of AMP as well as implement the new Medicaid Federal upper limit (FUL) program for generic drugs.

Summary

NASPA continues to support federal efforts that are designed to positively affect the affordability of and access to prescription drugs and healthcare professionals. While we are supportive of these efforts, we are compelled to offer the following comments on the CMS' December 20, 2006 proposed regulation that would provide a regulatory definition of AMP as well as implement the new Medicaid Federal upper limit (FUL) program for generic drugs. Specifically we will comment on two sections of the proposed regulation, §447.504 and §447.510. §447.504 addresses the methodology CMS will employ to determine AMP when the final regulation goes into effect. The methodology set forth in §447.504 creates three areas of concern: (i) the proposed definition of the retail pharmacy class of trade; (ii) the inclusion of Medicaid sales price data and its potential for artificial market impact; and (iii) the treatment of discounts rebates and price concessions. §447.510 of the proposed regulation addresses how manufacturers are to provide CMS with AMP data, defines the timing of the reporting and outlines the record keeping requirements. The methodology employed in §447.510 creates five areas of concern: (i) there is a potential for market manipulation inherent in the reporting process; (ii) the ability or in-ability of agencies to 'claw-back' in an effort to correct improperly reported AMP data is not defined; (iii) the reporting system itself creates an artificial price lag in the reimbursement basis; (iv) a provision to account and adjust for severe isolated price shifts is noticeably absent from the section; and (v) the suggested time for record retention is overly burdensome. Additionally NASPA offers comments in response to the CMS request for comment regarding the use of the 11-Digit NDC rather than the 9-Digit NDC code. The following comments are meant to address the above-mentioned nine (9) concerns.

§447.504 Determination of AMP

This section of the proposed regulation addresses the methodology CMS will employ to determine AMP when the final regulation goes into effect. The methodology employed to set forth the above tasks creates three areas of concern: (i) the proposed definition of the retail pharmacy class of trade; (ii) the inclusion of Medicaid sales price data and its potential for

artificial market impact; and (iii) the treatment of discounts rebates and price concessions. The following comments address these three areas of concern.

Defining Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade

Comments regarding Section 6001 (c) (1) of the DRA amending 1927 (k) (1) of the Act which revises the definition of AMP as it relates to "Definition of Retail Class of Trade and Determination of AMP" state that: "We believe, based in part on the OIG and GAO reports, that retail pharmacy class of trade means that sector of the drug marketplace, similar to the marketplace for other goods and services, which dispenses drugs to the general public and which includes all price concessions related to such goods and services. As such, we would exclude the prices of sales to nursing home pharmacies (long term care pharmacies) because nursing home pharmacies do not dispense to the general public. We would include in AMP the prices of sales and discounts to mail order pharmacies."

Proposed Section 447.504(e) comprises an overly inclusive definition of "retail class of trade." The proposed regulatory definition of AMP would not reflect the prices at which retail pharmacies purchase medications. Only manufacturers' sales to wholesalers for drugs sold to traditional retail pharmacies should be included in the AMP definition.

Mail order pharmacy and PBMs sales, just as LTC pharmacies, should be excluded because these are not traditional retail pharmacies. According to the GAO's own definition of retail pharmacy in its December 22, 2006 report entitled: *"Medicaid Outpatient Prescription Drugs: Estimated 2007 Federal Upper Limits for Reimbursement Compared with Retail Pharmacy Acquisition Costs,"* the GAO defines retail pharmacies as "licensed non-wholesale pharmacies that are open to the public." The "open to the public" distinction is not meet by mail order pharmacies as they are not open to the public and require unique contractual relationships for service. Moreover, these purchasers receive discounts, rebates and price concessions that are not available to traditional retail pharmacies, such as market share movement and formulary placement discounts, fundamentally making them different classes of trade. Given that retail pharmacies do not benefit from these rebates and discounts, the resulting AMP would be lower than the acquisition cost paid by retail pharmacies for medications.

The proposed regulation correctly assumes that LTC pharmacies do not dispense to the general public, and therefore, all price concessions received by LTC pharmacies should not be included in the definition of AMP. The proposed regulation, however, incorrectly makes an assumption that mail order pharmacies' and PBMs' discounts, rebates, and price concessions should be included in the definition of AMP because mail order and PBM pharmacies dispense to the general public. Again, the definition of "general public" must be analyzed in this assumption. Study data demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of Medicaid recipients do not receive their medications from mail order pharmacies or PBMs; Medicaid recipients obtain their medications from their community retail pharmacy unless state were to mandate mail order pharmacy. Most states bill for and receive rebates (or other price concessions) directly from the drug companies for their Medicaid programs. Proposing to include "all price concessions" given by drug manufacturers to mail order pharmacies and PBMs as part of AMP will artificially lower AMP because, as a matter of course, these pharmacies provide a fraction of the prescriptions to

this part of the "general public." For further discussion on the distinctions of mail order and PBM pharmacies from community retail pharmacies we address the unique contractual arrangements in detail later in these comments.

NASPA contends that PBMs do not "purchase prescription drugs from a manufacturer or wholesaler" or "[dispense] drugs to the general public". In order to do so, PBMs would need to be licensed as pharmacies under the applicable states laws. NASPA is unaware of any state that licenses PBMs, as pharmacies, to purchase, receive or dispense drugs to the general public. As such, we believe section 447.504(e) should be amended to eliminate all pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).

Mail order pharmacies are structurally similar to pharmacies that service nursing homes, which have been excluded in the proposed rule from the retail class of trade. Both types of operations are "closed door" in that they sell only to facilities or plans with which a contractual relationship exists. As with nursing home pharmacies, discounts and rebates that are available to mail order pharmacies rely greatly on the ability of the pharmacy to play a significant roll in determining which medications are dispensed. These same types of discounts are not available to traditional retail pharmacies.

As with the nursing home pharmacies, mail order pharmacies that operate as a closed door operation should not be included in the retail class of trade. As such, we believe section 447.504(e) should be amended to exclude any closed door mail order pharmacy and any mail order pharmacy whose rebate or discount arrangements are not available to other pharmacies in the retail pharmacy class of trade.

Excluding mail order and PBM pharmacies from the definition of the retail trade of pharmacy would offer numerous benefits to pricing data and regulatory oversight, including reduced recordkeeping requirements, reduced risk of price fluctuations, and limiting the need for additional regulatory burdens. Since there would be fewer transactions, fewer records will need to be maintained by manufacturers and reported to CMS, thus reducing the reporting requirements of manufacturers. Since mail order pharmacies are most likely to participate in discounts, rebates and other forms of price concessions, the nature of these complex contractual arrangements are more likely to lead to misstatements and errors in accounting and the need for re-statement of pricing information – particularly between quarters - creating pricing volatility and fluctuations in AMP values. Excluding mail order and PBM pharmacies from AMP calculations thus assists to provide greater certainty and reliability in pricing data. Vertical integration between manufacturers and mail order pharmacies creates transactions that are not arms length and thus afford opportunities for market manipulation. In the future, CMS would likely need to redress the impact or perceived impact inherent to the conflicts of these relationships, increasing regulatory oversight burdens to ensure true market pricing data.

While CMS recognizes the inherent lack of transparency to data in mail order and PBM pricing and contractual relationships, it advises that "removal [of mail order pharmacies] would not be consistent with past policy, as specified in Manufacturer Releases 28 and 29." Unfortunately, the past policies relied upon in this statement reflect an understanding of the pharmaceutical supply chain that is nearly a decade old, Manufacturer Releases 28 and 29 date to

1997. The level of vertical integration between PBMs and manufacturers, complexity of the rebate and price concession processes, and evolution of the marketplace require CMS to re-examine this policy. Furthermore, the calculation of AMP in Manufacturer Release 29 includes nursing home pharmacy pricing, while such pricing data is excluded in the currently proposed version of AMP. CMS is correct in changing policy with regard to nursing home pharmacies, and, as noted previously, the rationale for exclusion of nursing home pharmacies, as well as mail orders and PBMs, with regard to dispensing to the general public, is sound.

Inclusion of Medicaid Sales

It is our belief that 447.504(g)(12) should exclude Medicaid from AMP Data. Unlike Medicare Part D and non-Medicaid SCHIP, which have private party negotiators on formularies and reimbursement rates, Medicaid reimbursement structures vary state-to-state, with some having non-market based reimbursement rates. Moreover the inclusions of Medicaid data more likely than not would create a circular loop negating the validity of AMP. Given the above statements it is clear that counting Medicaid will have an artificial impact on market prices. Medicaid should be treated consistently with other federal payer programs, and also be excluded from AMP in the proposed regulation.

Discounts, Rebates and Price Concessions

NASPA contends that certain discounts, rebates and price concessions found in §447.504(g)(6) and (9) should not be included in the AMP calculation. Price concessions provided by drug companies to PBM and mail order pharmacies in the form of rebates, chargebacks or other contractual arrangements which, by their very relationship are not available to out-of-pocket customers or third party private sector parties. The proposed regulation concedes that the benefits of these rebates, price concessions, chargebacks and other contractual arrangements may not be - and NASPA asserts that they are not – shared with the community retail pharmacy networks, out-of-pocket customers, and third party payors, and, thus, they are not available to the "general public." Since PBM and mail order pharmacies (i) now often are vertically integrated with manufacturers and others in the supply chain, (ii) have contractual arrangements in many states that are not transparent in the healthcare system, and (iii) have purchasing power and drug substitution/distribution control greater than the other entities included in the retail class of trade, they are clearly distinguishable from the community retail pharmacies from which the Medicaid clients obtain their medications. For these reasons, we strongly urge CMS to reconsider the inclusion of mail order pharmacy rebates, chargebacks and other price concessions.

AMP should reflect the prices paid by retail pharmacies. However, the proposed regulation in Sections 447.504(a), (g) and (i) indicates types of discounts and price concessions that manufacturers should deduct from the calculation of the AMP. While discounts, rebates, chargebacks and other forms of price concessions may reduce the amount received by the manufacturer for drugs, they are not realized by retail pharmacies and do not reduce prices paid by retail pharmacies. The proposal incorrectly bases AMP, not on amounts paid by wholesalers -- the predominant supply source for retail pharmacies - but instead includes amounts that manufacturers pay to other entities, which in turn reduces the amount that manufacturers receive.

Manufacturers contractually agree to discounts and rebates, not because wholesalers pay them these discounts or rebates. Retail pharmacies should not bear the financial burden and risk of manufacturers' contractual decisions with such third parties. On the other hand, discounts and rebates paid by manufacturers that are actually passed through to community retail pharmacies should be deducted from manufacturers' sales to retail pharmacies when calculating the AMP. On balance, we are concerned that, including discounts, rebates and other price concessions that may reduce manufacturers' prices received, but not the retail pharmacies' prices paid, would have the perverse effect of reducing AMP, drastically below the actual acquisition price to the retail pharmacy. Including PBMs' sales and discounts makes AMP unreflective of sales to retail pharmacies. This concern was confirmed by a recent CBO report which said that "when pharmacies do contact doctors to change prescriptions, they may be acting on behalf of PBMs or health plans using formularies to manage drug spending, in which case, any rebates would go to the PBMs or the health plans and not the pharmacies."[1] Pharmacies are thus positioned to execute the dispensing requirements of PBMs, yet receive no benefit from their actions. Of greater concern, however, is the very real risk that, by including these rebates and lowering AMP, the traditional retail pharmacies may be reimbursed below their acquisition costs. This concern is highlighted in a recent study, which discovered, based on historical data, that "AMP-based FULs were, on average, 36 percent lower than average retail pharmacy acquisition costs."[2] The impact of these findings cannot be ignored. When factoring in information from numerous other studies on access to healthcare in rural areas and the results demonstrating the consistent trend of loss of retail pharmacies in these areas, CMS will need to develop yet another pricing structure or other system to ensure access to medication. These new structures will ultimately cost more to administer and reduce the actual savings realized under the proposed regulation.

§447.510 Requirements for Manufacturers.

This section of the proposed regulation addresses how manufacturers are to provide CMS with AMP data, defines the timing of the reporting and outlines the record keeping requirements. The methodology employed to set forth the above tasks creates five areas of concern: (i) there is a potential for market manipulation inherent in the reporting process; (ii) the ability or in-ability of agencies to 'claw-back' in an effort to correct improperly reported AMP data is not defined; (iii) the reporting system itself presents an artificial price lag in the reimbursement basis; (iv) a provision to account and adjust for severe isolated price shifts is noticeably absent from the section; and (v) the suggested time for record retention is overly burdensome. The following comments address each of these areas of concern.

Market Manipulation

Under the proposed regulation the manufacturer is required to report on both a monthly and quarterly basis. The quarterly reporting requirement matches the 'rebate period' and should accurately reflect any and all discounts the manufacturer choose to employ. The monthly reporting requirement states that the "manufacturer may estimate the impact of its end-of-quarter discounts and allocate these discounts in the monthly AMPs reported to CMS throughout the

[1] Prescription Drug Pricing in the Private Sector, Congressional Budget Office, January 2007.
[2] GAO-07-239R, Medicaid Federal Upper Limits, Government Accountability Office December 22, 2006.

rebate period".[3] The proposed regulation states that the allowable timeframe for revisions to the quarterly report is to be a period of three (3) years from the quarter in which the data was due.

As the entities engaged in the profession of pharmacy become more vertically integrated the potential for misuse of this dual reporting mechanism increases. Potentially, a manufacturer with a vertically integrated market position could use the 'rebate period' based reporting to manipulate AMP. Additionally, the ability to estimate and apply discounts to the monthly AMP can also allow for market manipulation. The accounting involved in this dual time-frame reporting allows a manufacturer with a vertically integrated position to shift costs and revenues, in the form of discounts employed, to enhance their financial position or, worse yet, manipulate the market through a manipulation of reported AMP. Furthermore, this ability would exist for a period of three (3) years, the allowable time for revisions. This undue flexibility, afforded to find a market price, allows for market manipulation, a potential loss of price transparency and places a significant accounting burden upon the manufacturer.

'Claw-back'

Given that the proposed regulation allows substantial flexibility, with regard to financial restatement, we would recommend that CMS clearly state its intent on the ability or in-ability to recoup erroneous payments or for a provider to claim shortages based on incorrect AMPs. Since removing the manufacturers ability too restate AMP would be to restrictive, guidance from CMS on this issue is paramount.

Pricing Lag

Under the proposed regulation, the AMP first reported to CMS could be as many as 30 days old. As such, the data will be out of date prior to dissemination to the states and the general public, a process potentially taking another 30 to 60 days. Additionally, the flexibility given the manufacturer to report discounts employed and the restatement figures will add significant variability to this lag. Material lag in AMP degrades transparency and places an undue burden upon the retail pharmacy class of trade. The technical difficulties and associated overhead burdens of limiting or eliminating this structural lag may prove to be insurmountable. Therefore, CMS should provide guidance to the states and other users of AMP on the proper method to address any issues resulting from the structural lag.

Severe Price Shifts

The inherent market volatility, associated with pharmaceutical manufacturing, occasionally results in dramatic shifts in price structure. The proposed regulation is noticeably silent in offering any mechanism to account for this fact. Severe price shifts and the significant issues associated with pricing lag can be effectively addressed with the implementation of trigger mechanisms. CMS should identify a reasonable and appropriate percentage shift in real time price that would trigger a review and recommendation by the Office of the Inspector General (IG). It is recommended that CMS clearly define the stakeholders empowered to alert CMS of significant price shifts. Once alerted the IG would research and then recommended an updated AMP figure to CMS. Following abbreviated review and comment by defined stakeholders, CMS

[3] §447.510(d)(2)

would then pass the revised AMP figure on to the states and other users of AMP by the most efficient electronic means.

In its simplest form the trigger mechanism could accomplish the following: (i) limit the affects of price posting lag; (ii) mitigate potential market manipulation; (iii) mitigate a possible disincentive to fill generics by the retail pharmacies; (iv) limit incorrect public data; and (v) provide CMS with the most up-to-date calculation of AMP. The ability to adjust the posted AMP, between reporting periods, will mitigate pricing lag by efficiently correcting any significant material shifts in pricing. A price that does not materially change from one reporting period to the next will be unaffected by any structural lag. However, a material shift in price during a reporting period is amplified by the structural lag inherent in the proposed regulation. An adequate trigger mechanism can address, and mitigate, the issues surrounding pricing lag. The ability for appropriate stakeholders to trigger a review of severe price fluctuations by the IG will act as a damper to market manipulation. The long standing intent of Congress and CMS to maximize generic utilization can be protected through a proper trigger mechanism. When a severe price fluctuation causes a generic drug's acquisition cost to rise above the FUL reimbursement rate there is a market disincentive to increase the drug's utilization. The trigger mechanisms ability to efficiently adjust the reported AMP will remove this disincentive by keeping the FUL in line with a near real time posting of the generic's AMP. Clearly the ability of CMS to efficiently respond to and adjust market fluctuations will severely limit incorrect public data and allow CMS the ability to have to most up-to-date AMP data.

Record Keeping

The proposed regulation states in §447.510(f)(1) that "[a] manufacturer must retain records (written or electronic) for 10 years from the date the manufacturer reports data to CMS for that rebate period". This time requirement is unduly burdensome and a substantial departure from the Internal Revenue Services' seven (7) year standard for audit record keeping. We recommend that CMS adjust the record keeping requirement in the proposed regulation to be consistent with the widely accepted seven (7) year standard.

Additional Comments

Use of the 11-Digit NDC Rather Than the 9-Digit NDC

CMS has asked for comments on whether the 11-digit NDC should be used to calculate the FUL or the 9-digit NDC. CMS offers a very compelling case in the proposed regulation's preamble as to why the 11-digit should be used, yet then states that "the legislation did not change the level at which manufacturers are to report AMP, and we find no evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended that AMP should be restructured to collect it by 11-digit NDCs." However, there is also no compelling evidence that Congressional intent was to have AMP calculated at the 9-digit level versus the 11-didgit level for generic drugs in determining FULs.

We believe that CMS should use the 11-digit AMP value for the most commonly-dispensed package size by retail pharmacies to calculate the FUL for a particular dosage form

and strength of a drug. The prices used to set the limits should be based on the most common package size dispensed by retail pharmacies. Current regulations specify that the FUL should be set on package sizes of 100 tablets or capsules or the package size most commonly dispensed by retail pharmacies. These entities can only be captured if the 11-digit package size is used.

We appreciate your consideration of these comments and ask that you please contact us with any questions. Thank you.

Sincerely,

James Marmar Executive Director

cc Sen.Patrick Leahey
Sen.Bernie Sanders
Rep.Peter Welch

1451-2

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERIVICES
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS & REGULATORY AFFAIRS

Please note: We did not receive the attachment that was cited in this comment. We are not able to receive attachments that have been prepared in excel or zip files. Also, the commenter must click the yellow "Attach File" button to forward the attachment.

Please direct your questions or comments to 1 800 743-3951.

March 27, 2007

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Attention CMS 2238-P Mail Stop C4-26-05
7500 Security Blvd
Baltimore, Maryland 21244-1850

Subject: Medicaid Program: Prescription Drugs; AMP Regulation
CMS 2238-P RIN 0938-AO20

The VERMONT PHARMACISTS ASSOCIATION is pleased to submit these comments to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) regarding CMS' December 20, 2006 proposed regulation that would provide a regulatory definition of AMP as well as implement the new Medicaid Federal upper limit (FUL) program for generic drugs.

Summary

NASPA continues to support federal efforts that are designed to positively affect the affordability of and access to prescription drugs and healthcare professionals. While we are supportive of these efforts, we are compelled to offer the following comments on the CMS' December 20, 2006 proposed regulation that would provide a regulatory definition of AMP as well as implement the new Medicaid Federal upper limit (FUL) program for generic drugs. Specifically we will comment on two sections of the proposed regulation, §447.504 and §447.510. §447.504 addresses the methodology CMS will employ to determine AMP when the final regulation goes into effect. The methodology set forth in §447.504 creates three areas of concern: (i) the proposed definition of the retail pharmacy class of trade; (ii) the inclusion of Medicaid sales price data and its potential for artificial market impact; and (iii) the treatment of discounts rebates and price concessions. §447.510 of the proposed regulation addresses how manufacturers are to provide CMS with AMP data, defines the timing of the reporting and outlines the record keeping requirements. The methodology employed in §447.510 creates five areas of concern: (i) there is a potential for market manipulation inherent in the reporting process; (ii) the ability or in-ability of agencies to 'claw-back' in an effort to correct improperly reported AMP data is not defined; (iii) the reporting system itself creates an artificial price lag in the reimbursement basis; (iv) a provision to account and adjust for severe isolated price shifts is noticeably absent from the section; and (v) the suggested time for record retention is overly burdensome. Additionally NASPA offers comments in response to the CMS request for comment regarding the use of the 11-Digit NDC rather than the 9-Digit NDC code. The following comments are meant to address the above-mentioned nine (9) concerns.

§447.504 Determination of AMP

This section of the proposed regulation addresses the methodology CMS will employ to determine AMP when the final regulation goes into effect. The methodology employed to set forth the above tasks creates three areas of concern: (i) the proposed definition of the retail pharmacy class of trade; (ii) the inclusion of Medicaid sales price data and its potential for

artificial market impact; and (iii) the treatment of discounts rebates and price concessions. The following comments address these three areas of concern.

Defining Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade

Comments regarding Section 6001 (c) (1) of the DRA amending 1927 (k) (1) of the Act which revises the definition of AMP as it relates to "Definition of Retail Class of Trade and Determination of AMP" state that: "We believe, based in part on the OIG and GAO reports, that retail pharmacy class of trade means that sector of the drug marketplace, similar to the marketplace for other goods and services, which dispenses drugs to the general public and which includes all price concessions related to such goods and services. As such, we would exclude the prices of sales to nursing home pharmacies (long term care pharmacies) because nursing home pharmacies do not dispense to the general public. We would include in AMP the prices of sales and discounts to mail order pharmacies."

Proposed Section 447.504(e) comprises an overly inclusive definition of "retail class of trade." The proposed regulatory definition of AMP would not reflect the prices at which retail pharmacies purchase medications. Only manufacturers' sales to wholesalers for drugs sold to traditional retail pharmacies should be included in the AMP definition.

Mail order pharmacy and PBMs sales, just as LTC pharmacies, should be excluded because these are not traditional retail pharmacies. According to the GAO's own definition of retail pharmacy in its December 22, 2006 report entitled: *"Medicaid Outpatient Prescription Drugs: Estimated 2007 Federal Upper Limits for Reimbursement Compared with Retail Pharmacy Acquisition Costs,"* the GAO defines retail pharmacies as "licensed non-wholesale pharmacies that are open to the public." The "open to the public" distinction is not meet by mail order pharmacies as they are not open to the public and require unique contractual relationships for service. Moreover, these purchasers receive discounts, rebates and price concessions that are not available to traditional retail pharmacies, such as market share movement and formulary placement discounts, fundamentally making them different classes of trade. Given that retail pharmacies do not benefit from these rebates and discounts, the resulting AMP would be lower than the acquisition cost paid by retail pharmacies for medications.

The proposed regulation correctly assumes that LTC pharmacies do not dispense to the general public, and therefore, all price concessions received by LTC pharmacies should not be included in the definition of AMP. The proposed regulation, however, incorrectly makes an assumption that mail order pharmacies' and PBMs' discounts, rebates, and price concessions should be included in the definition of AMP because mail order and PBM pharmacies dispense to the general public. Again, the definition of "general public" must be analyzed in this assumption. Study data demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of Medicaid recipients do not receive their medications from mail order pharmacies or PBMs; Medicaid recipients obtain their medications from their community retail pharmacy unless state were to mandate mail order pharmacy. Most states bill for and receive rebates (or other price concessions) directly from the drug companies for their Medicaid programs. Proposing to include "all price concessions" given by drug manufacturers to mail order pharmacies and PBMs as part of AMP will artificially lower AMP because, as a matter of course, these pharmacies provide a fraction of the prescriptions to

this part of the "general public." For further discussion on the distinctions of mail order and PBM pharmacies from community retail pharmacies we address the unique contractual arrangements in detail later in these comments.

NASPA contends that PBMs do not "purchase prescription drugs from a manufacturer or wholesaler" or "[dispense] drugs to the general public". In order to do so, PBMs would need to be licensed as pharmacies under the applicable states laws. NASPA is unaware of any state that licenses PBMs, as pharmacies, to purchase, receive or dispense drugs to the general public. As such, we believe section 447.504(e) should be amended to eliminate all pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).

Mail order pharmacies are structurally similar to pharmacies that service nursing homes, which have been excluded in the proposed rule from the retail class of trade. Both types of operations are "closed door" in that they sell only to facilities or plans with which a contractual relationship exists. As with nursing home pharmacies, discounts and rebates that are available to mail order pharmacies rely greatly on the ability of the pharmacy to play a significant roll in determining which medications are dispensed. These same types of discounts are not available to traditional retail pharmacies.

As with the nursing home pharmacies, mail order pharmacies that operate as a closed door operation should not be included in the retail class of trade. As such, we believe section 447.504(e) should be amended to exclude any closed door mail order pharmacy and any mail order pharmacy whose rebate or discount arrangements are not available to other pharmacies in the retail pharmacy class of trade.

Excluding mail order and PBM pharmacies from the definition of the retail trade of pharmacy would offer numerous benefits to pricing data and regulatory oversight, including reduced recordkeeping requirements, reduced risk of price fluctuations, and limiting the need for additional regulatory burdens. Since there would be fewer transactions, fewer records will need to be maintained by manufacturers and reported to CMS, thus reducing the reporting requirements of manufacturers. Since mail order pharmacies are most likely to participate in discounts, rebates and other forms of price concessions, the nature of these complex contractual arrangements are more likely to lead to misstatements and errors in accounting and the need for re-statement of pricing information – particularly between quarters - creating pricing volatility and fluctuations in AMP values. Excluding mail order and PBM pharmacies from AMP calculations thus assists to provide greater certainty and reliability in pricing data. Vertical integration between manufacturers and mail order pharmacies creates transactions that are not arms length and thus afford opportunities for market manipulation. In the future, CMS would likely need to redress the impact or perceived impact inherent to the conflicts of these relationships, increasing regulatory oversight burdens to ensure true market pricing data.

While CMS recognizes the inherent lack of transparency to data in mail order and PBM pricing and contractual relationships, it advises that "removal [of mail order pharmacies] would not be consistent with past policy, as specified in Manufacturer Releases 28 and 29." Unfortunately, the past policies relied upon in this statement reflect an understanding of the pharmaceutical supply chain that is nearly a decade old, Manufacturer Releases 28 and 29 date to

1997. The level of vertical integration between PBMs and manufacturers, complexity of the rebate and price concession processes, and evolution of the marketplace require CMS to re-examine this policy. Furthermore, the calculation of AMP in Manufacturer Release 29 includes nursing home pharmacy pricing, while such pricing data is excluded in the currently proposed version of AMP. CMS is correct in changing policy with regard to nursing home pharmacies, and, as noted previously, the rationale for exclusion of nursing home pharmacies, as well as mail orders and PBMs, with regard to dispensing to the general public, is sound.

Inclusion of Medicaid Sales

It is our belief that 447.504(g)(12) should exclude Medicaid from AMP Data. Unlike Medicare Part D and non-Medicaid SCHIP, which have private party negotiators on formularies and reimbursement rates, Medicaid reimbursement structures vary state-to-state, with some having non-market based reimbursement rates. Moreover the inclusions of Medicaid data more likely than not would create a circular loop negating the validity of AMP. Given the above statements it is clear that counting Medicaid will have an artificial impact on market prices. Medicaid should be treated consistently with other federal payor programs, and also be excluded from AMP in the proposed regulation.

Discounts, Rebates and Price Concessions

NASPA contends that certain discounts, rebates and price concessions found in §447.504(g)(6) and (9) should not be included in the AMP calculation. Price concessions provided by drug companies to PBM and mail order pharmacies in the form of rebates, chargebacks or other contractual arrangements which, by their very relationship are not available to out-of-pocket customers or third party private sector parties. The proposed regulation concedes that the benefits of these rebates, price concessions, chargebacks and other contractual arrangements may not be - and NASPA asserts that they are not – shared with the community retail pharmacy networks, out-of-pocket customers, and third party payors, and, thus, they are not available to the "general public." Since PBM and mail order pharmacies (i) now often are vertically integrated with manufacturers and others in the supply chain, (ii) have contractual arrangements in many states that are not transparent in the healthcare system, and (iii) have purchasing power and drug substitution/distribution control greater than the other entities included in the retail class of trade, they are clearly distinguishable from the community retail pharmacies from which the Medicaid clients obtain their medications. For these reasons, we strongly urge CMS to reconsider the inclusion of mail order pharmacy rebates, chargebacks and other price concessions.

AMP should reflect the prices paid by retail pharmacies. However, the proposed regulation in Sections 447.504(a), (g) and (i) indicates types of discounts and price concessions that manufacturers should deduct from the calculation of the AMP. While discounts, rebates, chargebacks and other forms of price concessions may reduce the amount received by the manufacturer for drugs, they are not realized by retail pharmacies and do not reduce prices paid by retail pharmacies. The proposal incorrectly bases AMP, not on amounts paid by wholesalers – the predominant supply source for retail pharmacies - but instead includes amounts that manufacturers pay to other entities, which in turn reduces the amount that manufacturers receive

Manufacturers contractually agree to discounts and rebates, not because wholesalers pay them these discounts or rebates. Retail pharmacies should not bear the financial burden and risk of manufacturers' contractual decisions with such third parties. On the other hand, discounts and rebates paid by manufacturers that are actually passed through to community retail pharmacies should be deducted from manufacturers' sales to retail pharmacies when calculating the AMP. On balance, we are concerned that, including discounts, rebates and other price concessions that may reduce manufacturers' prices received, but not the retail pharmacies' prices paid, would have the perverse effect of reducing AMP, drastically below the actual acquisition price to the retail pharmacy. Including PBMs' sales and discounts makes AMP unreflective of sales to retail pharmacies. This concern was confirmed by a recent CBO report which said that "when pharmacies do contact doctors to change prescriptions, they may be acting on behalf of PBMs or health plans using formularies to manage drug spending, in which case, any rebates would go to the PBMs or the health plans and not the pharmacies."[1] Pharmacies are thus positioned to execute the dispensing requirements of PBMs, yet receive no benefit from their actions. Of greater concern, however, is the very real risk that, by including these rebates and lowering AMP, the traditional retail pharmacies may be reimbursed below their acquisition costs. This concern is highlighted in a recent study, which discovered, based on historical data, that "AMP-based FULs were, on average, 36 percent lower than average retail pharmacy acquisition costs."[2] The impact of these findings cannot be ignored. When factoring in information from numerous other studies on access to healthcare in rural areas and the results demonstrating the consistent trend of loss of retail pharmacies in these areas, CMS will need to develop yet another pricing structure or other system to ensure access to medication. These new structures will ultimately cost more to administer and reduce the actual savings realized under the proposed regulation.

§447.510 Requirements for Manufacturers.

This section of the proposed regulation addresses how manufacturers are to provide CMS with AMP data, defines the timing of the reporting and outlines the record keeping requirements. The methodology employed to set forth the above tasks creates five areas of concern: (i) there is a potential for market manipulation inherent in the reporting process; (ii) the ability or in-ability of agencies to 'claw-back' in an effort to correct improperly reported AMP data is not defined; (iii) the reporting system itself presents an artificial price lag in the reimbursement basis; (iv) a provision to account and adjust for severe isolated price shifts is noticeably absent from the section; and (v) the suggested time for record retention is overly burdensome. The following comments address each of these areas of concern.

Market Manipulation

Under the proposed regulation the manufacturer is required to report on both a monthly and quarterly basis. The quarterly reporting requirement matches the 'rebate period' and should accurately reflect any and all discounts the manufacturer choose to employ. The monthly reporting requirement states that the "manufacturer may estimate the impact of its end-of-quarter discounts and allocate these discounts in the monthly AMPs reported to CMS throughout the

[1] Prescription Drug Pricing in the Private Sector, Congressional Budget Office, January 2007.
[2] GAO-07-239R, Medicaid Federal Upper Limits, Government Accountability Office December 22, 2006.

rebate period".[3] The proposed regulation states that the allowable timeframe for revisions to the quarterly report is to be a period of three (3) years from the quarter in which the data was due.

As the entities engaged in the profession of pharmacy become more vertically integrated the potential for misuse of this dual reporting mechanism increases. Potentially, a manufacturer with a vertically integrated market position could use the 'rebate period' based reporting to manipulate AMP. Additionally, the ability to estimate and apply discounts to the monthly AMP can also allow for market manipulation. The accounting involved in this dual time-frame reporting allows a manufacturer with a vertically integrated position to shift costs and revenues, in the form of discounts employed, to enhance their financial position or, worse yet, manipulate the market through a manipulation of reported AMP. Furthermore, this ability would exist for a period of three (3) years, the allowable time for revisions. This undue flexibility, afforded to find a market price, allows for market manipulation, a potential loss of price transparency and places a significant accounting burden upon the manufacturer.

'Claw-back'

Given that the proposed regulation allows substantial flexibility, with regard to financial restatement, we would recommend that CMS clearly state its intent on the ability or in-ability to recoup erroneous payments or for a provider to claim shortages based on incorrect AMPs. Since removing the manufacturers ability too restate AMP would be to restrictive, guidance from CMS on this issue is paramount.

Pricing Lag

Under the proposed regulation, the AMP first reported to CMS could be as many as 30 days old. As such, the data will be out of date prior to dissemination to the states and the general public, a process potentially taking another 30 to 60 days. Additionally, the flexibility given the manufacturer to report discounts employed and the restatement figures will add significant variability to this lag. Material lag in AMP degrades transparency and places an undue burden upon the retail pharmacy class of trade. The technical difficulties and associated overhead burdens of limiting or eliminating this structural lag may prove to be insurmountable. Therefore, CMS should provide guidance to the states and other users of AMP on the proper method to address any issues resulting from the structural lag.

Severe Price Shifts

The inherent market volatility, associated with pharmaceutical manufacturing, occasionally results in dramatic shifts in price structure. The proposed regulation is noticeably silent in offering any mechanism to account for this fact. Severe price shifts and the significant issues associated with pricing lag can be effectively addressed with the implementation of trigger mechanisms. CMS should identify a reasonable and appropriate percentage shift in real time price that would trigger a review and recommendation by the Office of the Inspector General (IG). It is recommended that CMS clearly define the stakeholders empowered to alert CMS of significant price shifts. Once alerted the IG would research and then recommended an updated AMP figure to CMS. Following abbreviated review and comment by defined stakeholders, CMS

[3] §447.510(d)(2)

would then pass the revised AMP figure on to the states and other users of AMP by the most efficient electronic means.

In its simplest form the trigger mechanism could accomplish the following: (i) limit the affects of price posting lag; (ii) mitigate potential market manipulation; (iii) mitigate a possible disincentive to fill generics by the retail pharmacies; (iv) limit incorrect public data; and (v) provide CMS with the most up-to-date calculation of AMP. The ability to adjust the posted AMP, between reporting periods, will mitigate pricing lag by efficiently correcting any significant material shifts in pricing. A price that does not materially change from one reporting period to the next will be unaffected by any structural lag. However, a material shift in price during a reporting period is amplified by the structural lag inherent in the proposed regulation. An adequate trigger mechanism can address, and mitigate, the issues surrounding pricing lag. The ability for appropriate stakeholders to trigger a review of severe price fluctuations by the IG will act as a damper to market manipulation. The long standing intent of Congress and CMS to maximize generic utilization can be protected through a proper trigger mechanism. When a severe price fluctuation causes a generic drug's acquisition cost to rise above the FUL reimbursement rate there is a market disincentive to increase the drug's utilization. The trigger mechanisms ability to efficiently adjust the reported AMP will remove this disincentive by keeping the FUL in line with a near real time posting of the generic's AMP. Clearly the ability of CMS to efficiently respond to and adjust market fluctuations will severely limit incorrect public data and allow CMS the ability to have to most up-to-date AMP data.

Record Keeping

The proposed regulation states in §447.510(f)(1) that "[a] manufacturer must retain records (written or electronic) for 10 years from the date the manufacturer reports data to CMS for that rebate period". This time requirement is unduly burdensome and a substantial departure from the Internal Revenue Services' seven (7) year standard for audit record keeping. We recommend that CMS adjust the record keeping requirement in the proposed regulation to be consistent with the widely accepted seven (7) year standard.

Additional Comments

Use of the 11-Digit NDC Rather Than the 9-Digit NDC

CMS has asked for comments on whether the 11-digit NDC should be used to calculate the FUL or the 9-digit NDC. CMS offers a very compelling case in the proposed regulation's preamble as to why the 11-digit should be used, yet then states that "the legislation did not change the level at which manufacturers are to report AMP, and we find no evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended that AMP should be restructured to collect it by 11-digit NDCs." However, there is also no compelling evidence that Congressional intent was to have AMP calculated at the 9-digit level versus the 11-didgit level for generic drugs in determining FULs.

We believe that CMS should use the 11-digit AMP value for the most commonly-dispensed package size by retail pharmacies to calculate the FUL for a particular dosage form

and strength of a drug. The prices used to set the limits should be based on the most common package size dispensed by retail pharmacies. Current regulations specify that the FUL should be set on package sizes of 100 tablets or capsules or the package size most commonly dispensed by retail pharmacies. These entities can only be captured if the 11-digit package size is used.

We appreciate your consideration of these comments and ask that you please contact us with any questions. Thank you.

Sincerely,

James Marmar Executive Director

cc: Sen.Patrick Leahey
Sen.Bernie Sanders
Rep.Peter Welch