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Title
Good quality care increases hospital profits under prospective payment.
First Author
Hsia, David C
Date of Pub
1992 Spring
Pages
17-26
Volume
13
Issue
3
Other Authors
Ahern, Cathaleen A
Abstract
This study shows that, contrary to popular belief, the prospective payment system discourages skimping on medically indicated care. The quality of care on a nationally representative sample of Medicare discharges underwent judgmental review using implicit criteria. The reviewing physicians identified hospitalizations that omitted medically indicated services and diagnoses overlooked because of this skimping. After deduction for the cost of the omitted services and probability of negative diagnostic tests, good quality care would have increased hospital profits a significant 7.9 percent. As the specificity of diagnosis and intensity of treatment increase, the DRG payment rises faster than the cost of providing medically indicated services.
Abstract Continued
N/A
MeSH
Data Collection : Diagnosis-Related Groups/economics/statistics & numerical data : Economics, Hospital/statistics & numerical data/trends : Evaluation Studies : Health Services Research : Human : Income/statistics & numerical data : Patient Discharge/statistics & numerical data : Prospective Payment System/economics : Quality of Health Care/economics/standards : United States
NTIS Number
PB2001-105738